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      奧利弗·哈特合同與治理研究中心 學術論壇第4期

      發布者:經濟學系     時間:2020-11-10     閱讀次數:624

      報告題目:Acceptance Deadlines and Job Offer Design聘用通知書的答復時限與聘用合同的設計

      報告人:趙昕(對外經濟貿易大學)

      報告時間:2020年11月12日(星期四)上午9:00-10:00

      報告地點:商學院大樓318會議室


      報告人簡介:

      趙昕,對外經濟貿易大學國際經濟貿易學院助理教授,于2016年獲得多倫多大學的經濟學博士學位,主要研究領域為微觀經濟理論,政治經濟學,以及行為與實驗經濟學。他當前的研究主要關注各種經濟設計問題,包括聘用合同的設計、決策委員會的設計,以及委托人具有私有信息時的機制設計問題。 


      報告摘要:

      We study talent recruiting in an incomplete-information environment with the acceptance deadline of a job offer being a strategic recruiting device. When the terms of employment stipulated in an offer are invariable, increasing the acceptance deadline raises the chance of hiring the candidates anticipating more promising outside options, but reduces the probability of hiring those with less promising alternatives. The employer is more likely to extend offers with extreme deadlines, i.e., exploding offers, which require immediate responses, and open offers, which have the longest deadline, when the candidate always postpones his acceptance decision until the deadline. In any case, committing itself to a firm deadline is not optimal for the employer; allowing requests for a deadline extension benefits the two parties. When incorporating the acceptance deadline into job offer design, the optimal design can be implemented using a “bonus-for-early-acceptance” (BFEA) mechanism, which is widely applied in practice. In an BFEA mechanism, the employer (1) specifies a date that its offer expires, and (2) provides a salary bonus of accepting the offer, which is decreasing over time before the offer expires. A candidate anticipating a better outside option takes a longer time to respond and receives a lower bonus. Our result indicates that the differences in the BFEA mechanisms adopted in various real-world labor markets reflect the level of competition faced by the employers.


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