發布者：經濟學系 時間：2020-12-01 閱讀次數：495
報告題目：Industry Structure and the Strategic Provision of Trade Credit by Upstream Firms（產業結構與上游企業對貿易信貸的策略供應）
Victor Song 博士, 加拿大西蒙菲莎大學彼迪商學院金融與創新創業跨學科助理教授，畢業于加拿大卡爾加里大學, 獲得經濟學與金融學雙博士學位。研究方向包括：公司金融財務，產業組織，應用博弈理論。Victor Song 博士多次獲得由加拿大西蒙菲沙大學和卡爾加里大學授予的最佳教學獎; 并在Review of Financial Studies 等世界頂級金融期刊發表論文多篇。
We explain trade credit financing as a strategic tool for a supplier to influence her retailer behavior in a product market, provide a new rationale for the existence as well as the contract structure of trade credit financing, and show why financially unconstrained firms occasionally finance their inventory with expensive trade credit. In our model competing supply chains deliver a homogeneous good to a market with imperfect competition where retailers have to make inventory decisions before demand is realized. When demand is weak trade credit financing makes the retailer more aggressive as he avoids having to finance unsold inventory at the high trade credit interest rate. The ex-ante expected cost of having to finance excess inventory at the high trade credit rate when demand is weak reduces retailers' optimal ex-ante inventory levels. When demand is high sales are constrained by inventory and competition is less intense. The modified product market behavior induced by trade credit financing increases the producer surplus at the expense of consumer surplus in oligopoly markets, while we find no benefit for producers in either monopoly or perfect competition. We empirically confirm an inverse U-shape relationship of trade credit use and competition for a sample of U.S. firms.